Towards Probability-based Safety Verification of Systems with Components
  from Machine Learning by Kaindl, Hermann & Kramer, Stefan
 ©2020 Hermann Kaindl and Stefan Kramer 
Towards Probability-based Safety Verification of 
Systems with Components from Machine Learning  
 
Hermann Kaindl 
Institute of Computer Technology 
TU Wien  
Vienna, Austria 
kaindl@ict.tuwien.ac.at 
 
Stefan Kramer 
Institute of Computer Science  
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz  
Mainz, Germany 
kramer@informatik.uni-mainz.de
Abstract—Machine learning (ML) has recently created many 
new success stories. Hence, there is a strong motivation to use 
ML technology in software-intensive systems, including safety-
critical systems. This raises the issue of safety verification of ML-
based systems, which is currently thought to be infeasible or, at 
least, very hard. We think that it requires taking into account 
specific properties of ML technology such as: (i) Most ML 
approaches are inductive, which is both their power and their 
source of error. (ii)  Neural networks (NN) resulting from deep 
learning are at the current state of the art not transparent. Con-
sequently, there will always be errors remaining and, at least for 
deep NNs (DNNs), verification of their internal structure is 
extremely hard. In general, safety engineering cannot provide 
full guarantees that no harm will ever occur. That is why prob-
abilities are used, e.g., for specifying a risk or a Tolerable Hazard 
Rate (THR). 
In this vision paper, we propose verification based on prob-
abilities of errors both estimated by controlled experiments and 
output by the inductively learned classifier itself. Generalization 
error bounds may propagate to the probabilities of a hazard, 
which must not exceed a THR. As a result, the quantitatively 
determined bound on the probability of a classification error of 
an ML component in a safety-critical system contributes in a 
well-defined way to the latter’s overall safety verification. 
Keywords—safety engineering, machine learning, deep learn-
ing, neural networks, inductive generalization, generalization 
error bounds 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Software-intensive systems, in particular cyber-physical 
systems (CPS), need to have essential properties like security 
and safety. While security especially of deep neural networks  
(DNN) has already been studied theoretically [1], there is an 
urgent need for a new safety framework. Hence, the focus of 
this paper is on safety verification of systems with components 
from machine learning (but not on systems that learn while 
being applied). 
 In practice, safety is taken very seriously, e.g., for railway 
systems, see EN 50126, and there is a relatively new automo-
tive standard for functional safety (of traditional cars), ISO 
26262. It does not address safety assurance of ML-based func-
tions, however. This was a key motivation for ISO/PAS 21448 
on safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF), where Annex 
I (informatively) mentions a few of the issues involved in 
using ML in safety-critical systems. The Automated Driving 
Roadmap ERTRAC 17 [2] contains the challenge of applying 
artificial intelligence, in particular (deep) ML, with regard to 
safety. There are no hints, however, on how to address it.  
According to the standard ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, a 
safety risk combines the severity of harm with the probability 
that it occurs. Also THR and (A)SIL – (Automotive) Safety 
Integrity Level – are defined based on probabilities. Hence, 
we approach the difficult issue of safety verification of ML-
based software-intensive systems on the basis of probabilities. 
In fact, we propose to be even more ambitious than the 
current approach to verification of conventional automotive 
software according to the standard ISO 26262, where no 
explicit estimation of probabilities is included. The safety 
assurance principle of ISO 26262 assumes that an adequate 
level of rigor can reduce the residual risk of a hazard due to 
software failure to an acceptable level. And according to IEC 
61508-3, quantification of probabilities is not required. 
In this paper, we propose a new theoretical framework for 
safety verification of software-intensive systems including 
ML technology. It is based on existing work on safety verifi-
cation, but has to take into account that especially for DNN 
only black-box approaches will be applicable in the near 
future, since they are currently considered opaque. Including 
controlled experiments for such a purpose is new for practical 
use, and the way of managing the data for such experiments 
will be new as well. In particular, this new framework 
involves determining a probabilistic generalization error 
bound, i.e., an upper bound on the true generalization error 
based on a quantity that is calculated on the training set, e.g., 
the empirical error plus some term depending on a complexity 
measure. One typical form of bound would be that, for any 
δ>0, it holds with probability at least 1-𝛿 that for all hypothe-
ses or models h ∈ H: Errorrtue(h) ൑ Erroremp(h) + f(H, D, 𝛿). 
where D is the training set. One central component of gener-
alization bounds are complexity measures.  
An essential problem to be solved is that presenting 
instances for learning requires taking into account the right 
context in the application and in the final model, such that spe-
cific instances or sets of instances become relevant whenever 
needed. This has to be taken into account in the determination 
of hazard rates or risks, too. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following 
manner. First, we sketch some background material and the 
state of the art, in order to make this paper self-contained. 
After that, we lay out a new framework for safety verification. 
Focusing on one of its key parts, we then sketch how one can 
take advantage of recent progress with probabilistic gen-
eralization error bounds for deep learning for the purpose of 
safety engineering. Finally, we draw a tentative conclusion 
and propose future work. 
  
II. BACKGROUND AND STATE OF THE ART 
For the safety integrity of preexisting software, IEC 
61508-7-D is an informative appendix of this safety standard. 
It provides guidance for an approach to estimation of 
probabilities from statistics gained from previous use of 
exactly this software in the course of operations. It may be 
used, for instance, to show that a piece of software originally 
built according to the requirements of SIL1 of IEC 61508-3, 
also fits SIL2, after an appropriate time of use and an 
appropriate number of applications during successful 
operations. 
Recently, Salay and Czarnecki [3] adapted and extended 
the standard ISO 26262 to address safety assurance of ML-
based functions, making a detailed assessment and adaption of 
ISO 26262 for ML, specifically in the context of supervised 
learning. They carefully analyzed and adapted each 
requirement in this standard and, where gaps were found, they 
proposed additional requirements. Still, they kept the safety 
assurance principle of ISO 26262 that developing software 
using an adequate level of rigor can reduce the residual risk of 
hazard due to software failure (termination of its ability to 
perform a function as required) to an acceptable level. We 
propose to be more ambitious through experimentally 
determined probabilities, aiming for higher guarantees of 
safety assurance for DNN than currently for traditional 
software that is yet to be put into operation. We consider this 
very important for potential medical applications as well. 
Annex I of ISO/PAS 21448 essentially mentions un-
intended bias or distortion in the collected data as problems, 
referring to [4]. In fact, one of the most common assumptions 
in ML is that the training set and test sets are drawn from the 
same underlying distribution (i.i.d. – independently drawn 
from the identical distribution), that is, the training situation 
resembles the test situation. Of course, it is important that the 
training data actually corresponds to the intended operational 
domain. Without any further precautions or mechanisms, only 
then and with an increasing number of instances, learning, in 
the sense of getting measurably better at a task with increasing 
evidence, can take place.  
Verification of DNN models is currently viewed as very 
hard, due to their high nonlinearity emerging from a high 
number of layers, and the variety of different architectures and 
topologies [5]. This work and Huang et al. [6] make a claim 
about safety verification while, in fact, both deal with a kind 
of robustness, more specifically against adversarial per-
turbations. It was taken up for confidence claims for analyzing 
robustness in [7], where more generally confidence arguments 
are presented for evidence of performance in machine learning 
for highly automated driving functions. We think that such 
arguments could be stronger if based on probabilities. 
In [8], the problem of accidents in machine learning 
systems is discussed by taking particular properties of ML into 
account, but not even mentioning induction. Generally, 
inductive machine learning is a case of inductive gener-
alization, which is by definition not truth-preserving and an 
unsafe type of inference [9]. That is why it is common to study 
generalization on the basis of learning curves, where the x-
axis represents the number of training instances and the y-axis 
represents a chosen performance measure (for a recent 
example in the context of software product lines, see [10]). 
If probabilistic guarantees for the performance of an ML 
model are required, one can resort to generalization error 
bounds [11, 12]. Considering DNN, it has been observed that 
their behavior is sometimes unstable, i.e., their output varies 
largely depending on only small perturbations of the input. 
First approaches have addressed this problem from a technical 
point of view [13], e.g., by changing the training protocol or 
by alternative loss functions. From a higher point of view, the 
problems and variants are not much different than laid out 
already long time ago [14]. Nevertheless, it has been observed 
that error bounds based on traditional computational learning 
theory (e.g., based on the VC dimension or the Rademacher 
penalty) do not work for deep learning models, because of 
their large capacity. This is in contradiction to their often 
outstanding generalization performance. Recent progress in 
this area [15, 16] does not only improve this situation, but 
promises to be applicable in practice, at least in combination 
with empirical error measurement. For a discussion of the 
relevant issues and topics, we refer to a recent survey paper 
[17]. 
A more recent, large-scale experimental comparison 
shows the correlation of current generalization bounds and 
their underlying complexity measures with actual general-
ization performance [18]. The results suggest that many of the 
existing margin- and norm-based bounds fail at “predicting” 
the actual generalization performance. However, the results 
also suggest that bounds and generalization measures centered 
around the notion of “sharpness” of local minima show great 
promise in that respect. In particular, magnitude-based pertur-
bation bounds (see Section 4.3.1 there and Appendix C.3 for 
actual calculations) exhibit the highest mutual information 
with generalization overall. 
III. THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY VERIFICATION 
In the new framework, we consider the overall approach 
as an iterative, systematic and defined process. In particular, 
we propose to iterate over the following steps: 
1. Data preparation and learning (as usual); 
2. Estimation of probabilities of errors (wrong results 
from the inductively learned classifier) through con-
trolled experiments and determination of a probabil-
istic generalization error bound; 
3. If this error bound is insufficient, repeat by going 
back to 1 with additional data, or otherwise, exit suc-
cessfully. 
 
As long as the outcome in terms of the generalization error 
bound is considered insufficient, inductive learning will have 
to be continued with additional training data, most importantly 
also including “edge cases” or “near misses”. From a statisti-
cal perspective, this poses the problem of the usual assumption 
that the distribution for testing is identical to the distribution 
for training. Changing the training procedure in the way pro-
posed above may invalidate this assumption. Hence, some 
care will have to be taken to ensure it. And again, the training 
data need to correspond to the intended operational domain. It 
should be noted that the proposed procedure makes heuristic 
use of statistics and statistical learning theory, but due to its 
theoretical underpinning it is still more reliable than working 
solely with empirical errors. 
Practically useful generalization bounds for deep learning 
are just about to emerge. A recent paper (and its updates) 
based on compression [16] improves upon previous ap-
proaches (e.g., [15]), and hints at practical applicability (see 
Fig. 4 in that paper, for a comparison with existing bounds and 
  
between the bound and the measured error). While the scale 
of the bound still differs by magnitudes, the rankings of the 
models according to the empirical error and according to the 
bound are correlated. A very recent, large-scale empirical 
comparison [18] (see also above) showed that so-called 
“sharpness-based measures”, e.g., magnitude-aware perturba-
tion bounds, have the highest current overall correlation with 
actual generalization performance. This suggests that such a 
bound could already be used, perhaps together with other 
measures, for model selection, i.e., picking a suitable model 
from a set of several, e.g., differently parameterized candidate 
models.   
For making such an approach sound, also the inclusion of 
context for the instances involved is relevant. Developing a 
general scheme for the applicability domain of ML models 
will contribute to more predictable behavior. The applicability 
domain has been a concept for machine learning models only 
in chemical risk assessment so far [19], but could prove valu-
able in more general settings. The idea is that models should 
be allowed to interpolate, but not to extrapolate. The applica-
bility domain defines the scope or competence of a classifier. 
Within the applicability domain, the error rates, in particular 
the false-positive and false-negative rates, are demanded to 
remain below specified thresholds. Abstaining classifiers (i.e., 
classifiers with the reject option) are also likely to play a role, 
because there will be instances outside the applicability 
domain. It will be possible to choose machine learning models 
with desired properties dynamically and systematically ac-
cording to the current context. 
Finally, the results of generalization error bounds along 
with the empirical error can be propagated to the hazard or risk 
analysis of the overall safety-critical system, see below for a 
sketch.  
IV. HOW TO USE PROBABILISTIC GENERALIZATION ERROR 
BOUNDS 
At the current state of the art, usually functional safety 
engineering is applied to safety-critical systems development, 
which involves the identification of safety-related functions. 
We are interested in cases where a classifier resulting from 
ML delivers such a function. In such a case, it will also have 
to be included in probabilistic hazard or risk assessment of this 
system. Once the causality of some hazard as related to the 
ML component is understood, the contribution of its error 
probability to the probability of function failure, and indirectly 
to the probability of this hazard and related risks of the overall 
system can be determined. More precisely, we propose to use 
a probabilistic generalization error bound of the ML compo-
nent for these analyses, since this will increase safety as 
compared to directly using error probabilities (see above for 
the difference).  
Actually, a probability of failure will have to be deter-
mined, based on both the measured empirical error and a 
probabilistic generalization error bound of the ML compo-
nent. While an error just means a wrong answer, a failure 
means a complete termination of the ability of the ML 
component to perform its function as required. For example, 
if an ML component will be deployed on a dedicated computer 
system possibly even including special-purpose hardware 
(like a DNN), its failure may also be caused by a failure of this 
computer system, and this has to be taken into account addi-
tionally. 
For hazard or risk analyses, the envisaged use of the 
safety-related functions and their possible failure must be 
analyzed, in order to identify possible hazards in the context 
of this particular system. For an overview of the key concepts 
involved, see Fig. 1 taken from [20], where we studied these 
concepts and their relationships qualitatively both for auto-
motive and railway safety standards. First, we created a core 
ontology of safety risk concepts, since the terminology and 
even the concepts of the automotive standard ISO 26262 are 
not fully aligned with the ones for railway [21]. Fig. 1 addi-
tionally includes the concept of a risk. Since safety risks 
involve both the severity and the probability of some harm 
possibly caused by the failure of a classifier resulting from 
ML, determining its probabilistic generalization error bound 
is key. 
Fig. 1. Conceptual model defining a core ontology of safety risk concepts 
(diagram taken from [20]). 
As shown in Fig. 1, the operational situation or circum-
stance is relevant as well, and this will even reinforce the 
problem of applicability domains of the classifier resulting 
from ML. We conjecture that it may be handled analogously 
to hardware, which has different probabilities of failure, e.g., 
at different temperatures. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
For (random) failures of hardware components, assessing 
their probabilities and using them for hazard or risk analyses 
is common practice for a long time now. For software failures 
especially of new software, in contrast, there is no practical 
approach for really determining their probabilities at the cur-
rent state of the art (where IEC 61508-7-D presents a statisti-
cal approach based on previous use of exactly the same soft-
ware, i.e., without any single change). For failures caused by 
errors of inductively learned classifiers, however, we claim 
that our approach as outlined here has the potential to provide 
generalization error bounds in the future.  
This vision paper brings together that for classifiers result-
ing from ML, generalization error bounds may be provided, 
and that these, together with empirically estimated error 
probabilities, can then be used for risk or hazard analyses in a 
mathematically founded way. The prospective benefits of 
such an approach are high, since there maybe even ‘better’ 
safety cases for ML-based systems in practice than the current 
ones for traditional software, where usually no probability 
calculations are done for determining a SIL or ASIL. Hence, 
the overall scientific relevance for the field of Information and 
  
Communication Technology is very high, in order to make 
ML technology applicable within software-intensive systems, 
in particular safety-critical systems. 
Future work will have to develop a mechanism that recog-
nizes changing distributions, outliers and edge cases, and ex-
plicitly handles them dynamically in a statistically sound way. 
Different distributions may be modeled for different contexts, 
with an additional layer that recognizes the context and picks 
the right distribution or part of a model [22]. An example in 
the domain of driving would be one distribution or model for 
driving on a Californian highway, and another one for an old 
Italian city. Different contexts would require different distri-
butions or parts of models. Generally speaking, presenting 
hand-picked instances for learning requires taking into 
account in the application and in the final model, that the right 
context is picked, such that specific instances or sets of in-
stances become relevant whenever needed. 
After the availability of these theoretical results as well as 
their take-up for engineering practice, both the societal and the 
economic prospects are great. The safety risks of ML-based 
systems will be precisely known, and only ‘sufficiently’ safe 
systems may be used, leading to less harm and greater eco-
nomic value. 
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